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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 20000720-CA
Priority No. 2

DEBRA LARECE ARANDA,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for Aggravated Burglary, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts of
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1999); and one count of Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999), in the Third Judicial
District Court, State of Utah, the Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j)
(1996). See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I. Whether the trial court erred by refusing to allow criminal history and character
evidence on two persons known to the State to be at the robbery in support of Appellant's
compulsion defense.
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit or excluded character
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Salt Lake City v. Alires. 2000 UT

App 244, Tf75 9 P.3d 769.
II. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's Motion to Continue during
trial and Motion for New Trial based upon her surprise when a key witness was not
allowed to enter the courthouse to testify.
Standard of Review: "[W]e review the decision to grant or deny a motion for a
new trial only for an abuse of discretion. Any legal determinations made by the trial
court as a basis for its denial of a new trial motion are reviewed for correctness." State v.
Loose, 2000 UT 11, ^|8, 994 P.2d 1237 (citations omitted). The denial of a motion for a
continuance is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750,
752 (Utah 1982).
III. Whether the trial court's errors require reversal individually and under the
cumulative error doctrine.
Standard of Review: "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court]
will reverse only if'the cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence
. . that a fair trial was had.'" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (quotation
omitted).
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant Debra Larece Aranda's motion to submit evidence of the criminal
history and character of two persons know to the State to be at the robbery in support of
her compulsion defense is preserved at R.280-81,360[32-33,77-78]. Aranda's motion for
a new trial based on surprise when a key witness was not allowed into the courthouse to
2

testify is preserved at R.308-10,323-24,360[75-77],363.
STATUTE. RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, Due Process:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.
U.S. Const, amend. VI, Rights of the Accused:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury . . . [and] to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7, Due Process:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend in person . . . [and] to have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury.
Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) (2000), Methods of Proving Character:
(a) Reputation or Opinion. In all cases in which evidence of character or a
trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony
as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of
conduct.
(b) Specific Instances of Conduct. In cases in which character or a trait of
character of a person is essential element of a charge, claim, or defense,
proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's conduct.

3

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1999), Compulsion Defense:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when he engaged in the proscribed
conduct because he was coerced to do so by the use or threatened imminent
use of unlawful physical force upon him or a third person, which force or
threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would not
have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion provided by this section shall be unavailable
to a person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places himself in a
situation in which it is probable that he will be subjected to duress.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings,
and Disposition in the Court Below.
Aranda was charged by information with one count of aggravated burglary, a first
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (1999); two counts of
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302
(1999); two counts of aggravated kidnaping, a first degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-302 (1999); and two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, one a third degree felony and one a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1999). R.17-19. An arrest warrant was issued. R.l-2.
Aranda's case went to trial. R.211-12,280-81. She moved for a directed verdict
based on insufficient evidence at the close of the State's case in chief. R.281;360[28].
The trial court denied the motion. Id.
Aranda attempted to introduce evidence concerning the criminal history and
character of two suspects involved in the robbery and known to the State under Utah Rule
of Evidence 405(b) during her cross examination of Detective Nudd and direct
4

examination of William Jay Eaton ("Eaton") in support of her compulsion defense.
R.281,360[28,32-33]. The State asserted that the evidence was inadmissible under Utah
Rules of Evidence 608, 609 and 404(a) and -(b). R.360[26]. The trial court sustained the
State's objection to the evidence reasoning that it was hearsay. R.360[26,32-34]. Aranda
reasserted at the close of trial that the evidence should come in because it supported her
defense. R.360[77-78]. The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible, stating,
"my review of the rules led me to the conclusion that to allow testimony regarding the
prior bad acts or criminal history of two persons who were not going to testify in the trial,
who were not witnesses, would simply tend to confuse the jury, would sidetrack the
issues of the case and would, quite frankly, be in large part irrelevant." R.360[78].
Midtrial, Aranda learned that one of her witnesses, Terry Pierce ("Pierce"), who
appeared at the courthouse to testify, was not allowed inside by the bailiffs because he
was inebriated. R.360[75-76]. Aranda moved for a two-hour continuance in order to
locate Pierce. R.326. The trial court denied the motion, stating, "I did allow you some
time to go down and see if you couldn't locate him after the word from the bailiffs was
received. But I did deny your request to continue the trial until such time as this witness
had sobered up and you could have him return." R.360[77]. Aranda made a related
motion for a new trial, arguing that the denial of the continuance prejudiced the trial
outcome. R.308-10,363. The trial court denied that motion as well. R.325-26.
Aranda was convicted as charged of aggravated burglary, two counts of aggravated
robbery, and two counts of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. R.281. She
5

was acquitted of the two counts of aggravated kidnaping. R.281. Aranda appeals from
her convictions for aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 22, 1999, Aranda and two men, Greg Myers ("Myers") and John Hender
("Hender"), went to the apartment of Honorio Garcia ("Garcia'') and Norma Rosales
("Rosales"). R.360[37]. Aranda testified that Garcia was a drug dealer. R.360[37-38].
She met him through William Jay Eaton ("Eaton"), and acted as a go-between in drug
deals between Garcia and Hender. R.3 60 [3 8]. Aranda was planning on moving to
Kansas with her fiance, Terry Pierce ("Pierce"), and so decided to introduce Hender to
Garcia so that they could do business directly in the future. Id. Aranda called Garcia the
night before to ask if she could bring Hender to the apartment; Garcia agreed. R.360[29].
Hence, Hender and Myers accompanied Aranda to Garcia's apartment. R.360[39-40].
Aranda knocked on Garcia's door. R.360[41]. Garcia answered and she and
Myers entered. Id. Hender remained in the car. Id. Soon, Hender came in and began
talking with Garcia. Id. Hender asked to see Garcia's scale, and became agitated when
Garcia claimed it did not work because of dead batteries. Id Hender became agitated
and pushed Garcia, demanding that he find new batteries. R.360[42]. Garcia told
Hender he would not do business with him. Id. Hender responded that he would do
business with him, pulled a knife, and grabbed Garcia by the shoulder. Id Aranda
testified that Hender grabbed the knife from a nearby dishdrainer in the kitchen where
they conversed. Id
6

Aranda asked Hender what he was doing. R.360[43]. Hender ordered her to find
any drug money, stereo equipment, and other valuables in the apartment. Id. Aranda
considered running away at that point. R.3 60[43]. However, she opted to stay because
she was scared of Hender, knew that he was capable of hurting Garcia, Rosales and their
children, and felt guilty for bringing him to their apartment. R.360[43,60]. Although she
did not hear Hender threaten Garcia or Rosales directly, she knew he was capable of
violence. R.360[43]. She described Hender as aggressive and Myers as untrustworthy.
Hence, Aranda complied, looking in a hallway closet and then in a bedroom where
Rosales and her children were sleeping. R.360[43]. She saw Rosales and told her that
there was a man in the living room who wanted money. R.360[44]. Rosales, who does
not speak English, did not understand Aranda, so Aranda repeated that a man wanted
money. Id. Rosales still did not understand, so she told Aranda to go ask Garcia. Id.
Aranda was nervous about going back to Hender empty-handed, so she took some jewelry
that was in a box in the bedroom and put it in her purse. Id. She hoped that the jewelry
would coax Hender to leave the apartment. R.360[65]. Aranda returned to the living
room and said, "come on, come o n , . . . let's go, get out." R.360[44]. She walked out of
the door and Hender followed. Id.
Garcia and Rosales testified to a different set of facts. Testifying through an
interpreter, they stated that Garcia heard a knock on his door at 8 a.m., a time when he
usually does not have visitors. R.359[56,101]. Garcia answered the door. R.359[56].
Aranda and another man that he did not recognize were there. R.359[56-57]. They
7

asked for someone in English, but Garcia did not understand because he speaks Spanish.
R.359[58]. Aranda and the man asked for drugs, then the man went in asking if he could
use the bathroom. R.359[59-60]. Aranda came in too and closed the door. R.359[60].
She pulled a baggy from her purse that resembled drugs. Id.
The man came out of the bathroom with a knife. R.359[60]. He held it to Garcia's
neck and told him not to move. R.359[60]. He ordered Garcia to sit on the couch and
said that he would kill him if he screamed. Id. A second man entered the apartment who
Garcia did not recognize. R.359[61]. He grabbed a knife from the kitchen and held it on
Garcia. R.359[64].
Aranda went into the bedroom where Rosales and the children slept.
R.359[61,102]. Aranda asked for, "money, money," at first in a soft voice and then more
emphatically. R.359[103,133-34]. Aranda came out of the bedroom with Rosales.
R.359[66]. Rosales went into the living room to ask Garcia what Aranda wanted.
R.359[104]. She saw Garcia on the couch and two men pointing knives at him.
R.359[104]. Aranda told Rosales to sit on the couch. R.359[64]. Garcia translated for
Rosales and told her to sit down. R.359[104].
The men asked Aranda for some duct tape which she pulled from her backpack.
R.359[63,106]. Aranda handed it to them, then began searching the apartment for
valuables while one of the men tied up Garcia and Rosales. R.359[64-65,67,106-08],
Garcia testified that he does not use gray duct tape in his work as a mechanic. R.359[92].
Rosales also testified that they do not keep duct tape at their house, but admitted that she
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did not know what kind of tape Garcia used in his business. R.359[136-37]. She
testified at Aranda's preliminary hearing, however, that Garcia used gray duct tape at his
work although they did not keep it at the apartment. R.359[138].
Garcia and Rosales heard Aranda rummaging through the drawers in the bedroom
and kitchen. R.359[68,108-09]. The men yelled at her to hurry up, calling her "Debbie."
R.359[69-70,109]. He heard the men ask her for a phone number. R.359[70]. He
memorized when she called it out to them. R.359[70]. Aranda went outside. R.359[72].
The men cut the phone cords, and took $2400 plus some gold jewelry. R.359[72,122].
Garcia claimed that $1500 was his from a family money pool. R.359[71]. Rosales also
testified that the $1500 came from a family pool, although she testified at the preliminary
hearing that it did not. R.359[141-42]. The remaining $900 and the jewelry was from
Rosales1 jewelry business. R.359[71,l 15,118]. The men also took Garcia's car keys.
R.359[71,l 13], Garcia and Rosales observed as the men made a failed attempt to get into
their truck. R.359[72,122].
When Aranda and the men left, Garcia untied himself and Rosales and called the
police. R.356[74-75,123]. Aranda and the men were gone by the time the police
responded. R.359[75]. Garcia gave the phone number that he memorized to the police.
R.359[76].
Rosales testified at her trial that she did not know that Hender and Myers planned
to rob Garcia and Rosales. R.360[57]. She was surprised when she saw them with
knives. R.360[58-59]. She did not notice that Hender and Myers had tied up Rosales and
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Garcia with duct tape because she was too ashamed to look at them and wanted to get out
of the apartment as quick as possible. R.360[45,61-62,66]. She initially testified that she
did not bring the duct tape. R.360[58]. Then she stated that she may have had the tape in
her purse because she had been packing in preparation for her move. R.360[64].
Aranda testified that she started walking away after the robbery. R.360[46].
Hender and Myers, who were driving Hender's car, forced her to come with them.
R.360[46]. Aranda was scared so she complied. IdL They went to the Capitol Motel
where one of the men rented a room. Id. Aranda yelled at them for involving her in the
robbery. R.360[47]. She dumped the jewelry out of her purse and left. Id.
Meanwhile, Officers Kevin Nudd ("Nudd") and Paula Lozano ("Lozano"),
assigned to investigate the crime, traced the telephone number that Garcia memorized to a
house where Aranda was staying. R.359[145,152-53]. Garcia accompanied Nudd and
Lozano to the house. R.359[153-54]. Aranda was not there when they arrived, but Dick
Hicks, Aranda's housemate, informed Nudd that she had been living there for some time.
R.359[155].
Aranda drove up shortly thereafter in a beige car. R.359[156]. Garcia identified
her as one of the suspects. R.359[157]. Aranda gave Nudd her name. Id He testified
that she appeared jittery, nervous and evasive. R.359[156]. He asked about the car and
requested her identification. R.359[157]. She became belligerent and started calling out
to people inside her house. Id She told Nudd that she bought the car that morning,
producing a receipt for $750. R.359[158]. There were groceries in the trunk, which she
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bought that morning as well. R.359[159].
Nudd arrested Aranda. R.359[157]. She was searched incident to arrest by
Lozano. R.360[13]. Lozano found a pair of scissors in Aranda's back pant pocket, plus
money and three rings in her front pocket. Id. Aranda said the rings belonged to her
children. R.360[15]. Lozano asked what her child's name was, and Aranda responded,
"Jacob." Id. Lozano noted that one of the rings bore an "H." Id. Aranda said her son's
name was "Hajacob." Id. Lozano also searched Aranda's purse, in which she found a
baggy of cocaine, a baggy of marijuana, a ring and a watch. R.360[15-16]. Lozano
showed the jewelry to Garcia and Rosales, who identified it as their own. R.360[16].
Aranda was searched once more at the police station. R.360[17-18]. An
additional $620 was found in her pocket. R.360[18]. She told Lozano that the money
was previously hidden in her pants. Id. Lozano informed her that she was facing robbery
charges and that the money would be booked into evidence. R.360[ 18,22]. Aranda
replied, "I'm being accused of.. .robbing a drug dealer, how ironic." R.360[22].
Aranda followed up by telling Lozano that the police must not "want the jewelry bad
enough because she could take [them] to where it was." R.360[20].
Aranda testified that the money found on her person was from the sale of her
fiance's truck and was intended to be their moving money. R.360[48,72-73]. Although
Lozano understood Aranda to say it was her "tax money," R.360[14], Aranda actually
described it as her "truck money." R.360[72]. She explained that she lied to Lozano
about the rings because she was scared. R.360[55]. She also admitted that she has a drug
11

habit that she is trying to overcome, she had drugs on her at the time of arrest that she
planned to use on her road trip, and has been convicted for crimes of dishonesty, namely
drug-related forgeries. R.360[49,54-55,57].
Aranda also explained that she bought the new car that morning because she
wanted transportation to get out of town quickly since she was afraid of Hender, Myers
and Garcia. R.360[70]. She used her trip money to buy the car rather than get her own
car out of impound, even though that would have been cheaper, because she did not want
to wait for the weekend to pass and risk getting hurt. Id.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial abused its discretion in excluding testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence
405(b) (2001) that went to Hender and Myers violent activity and character. The
evidence established Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302
(1999). In excluding the evidence, the trial court violated Aranda's constitutional right to
present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due process); Utah Const, art.
I, § 7 (same). In addition, the jury was prevented from hearing pertinent information
going to Aranda's defense and, ultimately, the guilt or innocence question. Hence,
Aranda was denied her right to trial by an impartial jury. JSee U.S. Const, amend. IV
(right to impartial jury); Utah Const, art. I, § 12 (same).
The trial court likewise abused its discretion when it denied a continuance or a
new trial for the purpose of locating an absent witness, Terry Pierce. Pierce's testimony
was material and admissible; he could have been located and made available to testify
12

within a reasonable time; and Aranda exercised due diligence in otherwise making him
available to testify. See State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v.
Schreuden 712 P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985). In denying the continuance or new trial,
the trial court violated Aranda!s constitutional right to present witnesses in her favor and
make her defense. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12.
The trial court's errors merit reversal individually and cumulatively. See State v.
Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah App. 1991) (reviewing denial of continuance for
harmless error); Schreuden 712 P.2d at 274-75 (denial of new trial must prejudice
defendant); State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) (reviewing erroneous
admission of character evidence for harmless error); Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1229 (cumulative
error merits reversal if errors undermine confidence in trial outcome). Not only did they
materially prejudice Aranda in her ability to present a key witness and establish her
compulsion defense, but there is a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome absent the
errors. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987). Consequently, the outcome
of Aranda's trial is undermined, meriting reversal in this case. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1229.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING EVIDENCE
RELEVANT TO ARANDA'S COMPULSION DEFENSE.
A "defendant's right to present all competent evidence in h[er] defense is a right
guaranteed by the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7, as well as
13

our Federal Constitution, 14th Amendment." State v. Harding. 635 P.2d 33, 34 (Utah
1981).
In the present case, Aranda sought to admit evidence of the violent and criminal
character of the two other suspects involved in the robbery and burglary, Hender and
Myers, to establish her compulsion defense. In order to show compulsion, Aranda had to
submit evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (1999), Utah's compulsion
defense statute, which states:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense when [s]he engaged in the
proscribed conduct because [s]he was coerced to do so by the use or
threatened imminent use of unlawful physical force upon [her] or a third
person, which force or threatened force a person of reasonable firmness in
h[er] situation would not have resisted.
(2) The defense of compulsion . . . shall be unavailable to a person who
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly places [her]self in a situation in
which it is probable that [s]he will be subjected to duress.
Id.; see also R.257 (Jury Instruction 35A - Compulsion Defense).
In order to establish the elements of a compulsion defense, specific instances of
misconduct are admissible and relevant pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) (2000),
which states:
In cases in which character or a trait of character of a person is [an]
essential element of a charge, claim or defense, proof may also be made of
specific instances of that person's conduct.
Citing Rule 405(b), R.360[28], Aranda made her first effort to elicit testimony in
support of her compulsion defense during her cross-examination of State's witness Officer
Nudd in the following colloquy:
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Defense Counsel (to Officer Nudd): Now, this Greg Myers and John
Hender was given to you as a name actually by us as a person who was
there. Right?
Nudd: That's correct.
Defense Counsel: Now, this Myers and Hender have numerous robberies?
State: Judge, I am going to object at this time. And may we approach? . . . .
(Side-bar conference)
Judge Frederick: Sometimes, members of the jury, we have to discuss
matters at the bench which you're not to consider. They are irrelevant to
your consideration.
R.359[168-69].
Aranda's second effort to elicit testimony establishing her compulsion defense
came during her direct examination of William Jay Eaton during the following colloquy:
Eaton: I met Greg [Myers] through a friend of mine. And he introduced me
to John [Hender.] And they both come [sic] over to my house at one time
and I introduced [them] to Debbie when they came over.
Defense Counsel: How did that introduction take place?
Eaton: They showed up at the door and I answered the door. Greg was with
John, and Greg told me he had a friend with him, and I invited them in.
And we were in the front room and I introduced Debbie to Greg, and Greg
introduced me and Debbie to John. . . .
Defense Counsel: What did you know at the time about this John?
State: Judge, I'd object at this time as to relevancy.
Judge Frederick: Objection to irrelevant is sustained, what this witness
knew about John.
Defense Counsel: Okay. Well let me ask a more specific question then.
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Was there anything about John or Greg that you told Debra about?
State: Objection again, Judge. Relevancy and hearsay.
Judge Frederick: Sustained.
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, that goes directly to my defense, what she
knew about John and Greg.
Judge Frederick: What she knew about parties X, Y and Z is something in
her mind. But what you are asking this witness to do is give a statement
made out of court about the truth of what was represented.
Defense Counsel: It's his statement.
Judge Frederick: It's hearsay to the State, counsel. Objection is sustained
on both grounds.
Defense Counsel: Okay. . . . Now, did Debra, okay, give you any indication
of what she thought of, whether she was afraid of John?
Eaton: She didn't like John at all, or Greg.
State: I'd object again. This is basically a back door to hearsay as far as
what was told to this to this defendant or told to this witness by the
defendant.
Judge Frederick: It is.
Defense Counsel: It's my client's statement.
Judge Frederick: Your client has made a lot of statements that are not
admissible in court. That particular conversation that you're referring to
and asking this man to relate to us is hearsay to the State's case, and
therefore the objection is sustained.
Defense Counsel: How is a party's statement made by my client hearsay to
the State?
Judge Frederick: I have ruled. . . . You may not agree with me but I have
ruled. Let's move on. . . .
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Defense Counsel: I suppose that you were around John and Greg and
around Debra on other occasions.
Eaton: Yes, I was. All of my friends that came to the house Debbie pretty
much knew.
Defense Counsel: Did you observe how Debbie reacted when these people,
when John and Greg were around?
Eaton: There was a lot of friction between me and Debbie concerning a lot
of my friends. Greg was never one of my better friends. And the
association that I had with Greg and John, she didn't like that at all. She
was uncomfortable with it, more or less nervous most of the time. So it
caused a lot of friction between me and her.
Defense Counsel: What was she nervous about?
State: Objection, speculation.
Judge Frederick: Sustained.
Defense Counsel: Did she portray anything other than nervousness around
these people?
Eaton: She didn't like his appearance. She was intimidated by him.
Defense Counsel: I have no further questions.
R.360[31-35].
Judge Frederick summarized his rulings as to all of Aranda's proffered testimony
when he stated:
[C]ounsel for the State had objected to testimony incident to the criminal
histories of two persons who were, number one, not identified as witnesses;
number two, were not witnesses. And my review of the rules led me to the
conclusion that to allow testimony regarding the prior bad acts or criminal
history of the two persons who were not going to testify in the trial, who
were not witnesses, would simply tend to confuse the jury, would sidetrack
the issues of the case and would, quite frankly, be in large part irrelevant.
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R.360[78]. The trial court's decision is clearly erroneous and compromised Aranda's right
to present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. V & XIV (due process); Utah
Const, art. I, § 7 (same); United States v. McClure. 546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding
that exclusion of testimony concerning specific conduct of informant who threatened
defendant, proffered to show that defendant was coerced into selling drugs, constituted
reversible error).
Utah law is silent as to the application of Rule 405(b) in the context of defendants
proffering testimony to support a compulsion defense. However, Rule 405(b) is related
to 404(b) and, therefore, case law under Rule 404(b) is instructive. See, e.g.. State v.
Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 194-95 (Utah 1988) (Durham, J., concurring) (noting relationship
between Rule 404 and 405 as they concern character evidence and specific instances of
conduct). One such case, McClure, 546 F.2d 670, is instructive.
In McClure, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a lower court committed
reversible error when it excluded evidence that a DEA informant intimidated the
defendant into selling heroin. 546 F.2d at 672-73. Appellant asserted an entrapment
defense which "centered around the claim that he sold heroin to [a government agent]
because he was afraid of [the informant] and was threatened with dire consequences if he
refused." Id at 672. The evidence that appellant proffered consisted of information that
the informant had coerced other individuals into selling heroin, carried a gun just after the
sales made by defendant, and had carried out a systematic campaign of threats and
intimidation against other persons. Id.
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In holding that the trial court committed reversible error, McClure relied on
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)1 and reasoned:
under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) [footnote omitted] evidence of a systematic
campaign of threats and intimidation against other persons is admissible to
show lack of criminal intent by a defendant who claims to have been
illegally coerced. Rule 404(b) is normally used by the government to show
evidence of prior similar offenses committed by the defendant. In such
cases, strict standards for admissibility protect the defendant from
prejudice, [citation omitted.] But in the case before us it was the defendant
who sought to introduce evidence of the informant's scheme. His right to
present a vigorous defense required admission of the proffered testimony.
The fact that it referred exclusively to threats made by Carroll after the
sales by appellant affects its weight but not its admissibility, [footnote
omitted.]
We intimate no opinion as to the credibility of the appellant's entrapment
defense. We decide only that a jury could not properly convict him absent
the opportunity to hear the proffered testimony bearing upon his theory of
defense and weigh its credibility along with the other evidence in the case.
McClure. 546 F.2d at 673. McClure compels the like conclusion that exclusion of
Aranda's compulsion defense evidence is reversible error.
As required by Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1), Aranda had to show that she "was

1

Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.
It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident.
The wording of Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b) (2001) is identical but for one more
provision which states, "In other words, evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it
is relevant for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and
403."
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coerced to [commit the burglary and robberies] by the use or threatened imminent use of
unlawful physical force . . ., which force or threatened force a person of reasonable
firmness in h[er] situation would not have resisted." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1). To
the extent that Aranda had to show that she was compelled through fear of Hender and
Myers, specific instances of their conduct "is [an] essential element of. . . [her]
defense." Utah R. Evid. 405(b).
Specifically, evidence that Hender and Myers were previously convicted of
robbery, R.359[169]; evidence of what Eaton knew about Hender and Myers when he
introduced them to Aranda, R.360[32]; what he told Aranda about them, R.360[33];
whether and how Aranda indicated to Eaton what she thought of Hender and Myers,
R.360[33]; and why Aranda was nervous about them, R.360[34], goes to the reason that
she participated in the burglary and robberies. Such evidence showed that she was
reasonably afraid of imminent physical force against herself or Garcia, Rosales, and their
children, on account of their violent nature, their demonstrated history of violent crime
against people, and her pre-existing fear of them in which compelled her to commit the
burglary and robberies in this instance. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302(1); see also
Illinois v. Husted. 422 N.E.2d 962, 968 (111. App. 1981) (exclusion of statements
proffered to show effect of a person on defendant claiming compulsion constituted error);
( United States v. Swanson, 9 F.3d 1354, 1359 n.10 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that evidence
of threat issued by person who allegedly coerced defendant into manufacturing and
distributing marijuana would be admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 405(b) if known to
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defendant at time of offense).
Hence, as in McClure, the excluded evidence "show[ed] lack of [culpable] intent
by [Aranda] who claims to have been illegally coerced." 546 F.2d at 673; see also
Swanson, 9 F.3d at 1359 n.10. Accordingly, "[her] right to present a vigorous defense
required the admission of the proffered testimony." McClure. 546 F.2d at 673; see also
Illinois v. Canamore, 411 N.E.2d 292 (111. App. 1980) (exclusion of conversation integral
to defendant's theory of defense that she took car without knowledge that it was stolen
denied defendant fair trial).
The trial court's error is underscored by the fact that Aranda, not the State, sought
to introduce the evidence. R.359[169];360[31-34]. Where a defendant seeks to introduce
evidence, the rationale for strict standards excluding such testimony - to protect
defendants from undue prejudice - is not at play. See McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. If
anything, exclusion of the evidence impermissibly tipped the burden of proof onto
Aranda since, in the compulsion defense context, the State bears the burden to disprove
the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Jocic. 207 F.3d 889, 892 (7th
Cir. 2000) (defining government's burden once defendant presents prima facie case of
coercion). Without the proffered testimony, which constituted a significant and integral
portion of her compulsion defense, the State was effectively relieved of its burden to
make its case and thereby impermissibly profited from the trial court's error. See id.
In light of the foregoing, the trial court did not correctly exclude the proffered
testimony as hearsay or as confusing and irrelevant. As an initial matter, defense counsel
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asked Eaton, "[w]as there anything about John or Greg that you told Debra about."
R.360[32]. The court struck the testimony on the basis of hearsay. R.360[32-33]. Such
testimony is not hearsay by definition because it was offered by the declarant. "'Hearsay'
is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Utah R. Evid.
801(c) (2001) (emphasis added). Since Eaton made the statement that Aranda proffered,
he was the "declarant" for purposes of Rule 801(c). See Utah R. Evid. 801(b)
("'declarant' is a person who makes a statement"). Since he was the declarant, his
statement is not excludable as hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(b)-(c).
In addition, statements of this nature are not properly defined as hearsay in the
context of a coercion defense because they do not go to the "truth of the matter asserted."
Utah R. Evid. 801(c). "A threat [or other specific conduct] offered to .. . prove
propensity is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and, therefore, is not
hearsay." Swanson, 9 F.3d at 1358 n.7 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(c); United States v.
Wright. 783 F.2d 1091, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). A "threat [or other specific conduct]
would constitute hearsay only if. . .offered . . . to prove the truth of the words [or
conduct] asserted." Id; see also Canamore, 411 N.E.2d 292, 294 (statements made by
third person were not hearsay and were admissible "to demonstrate the effect of the
statements upon [defendant] and her companion. In this manner, she could advance her
reason for being unaware the automobile was stolen and buttress the good faith of her
beliefs").
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In the present case, the proffered testimony would have shown Hender and Myers1
propensity for violence and, hence, Aranda's fear of them for purposes of her compulsion
defense. Eaton's statement was not offered to prove that Hender and Myers actually
committed the specific acts. Accordingly, the trial court erroneously excluded his
testimony as hearsay.
The trial court similarly erred in excluding the proffered testimony as irrelevant,
confusing and misleading. R.360[78]. Utah Rule of Evidence 402 (2001) permits a trial
court to exclude evidence that is irrelevant, while Utah Rule of Evidence 403 (2001)
permits it to exclude evidence, even if relevant, if it is prejudicial, confusing, misleading,
cumulative, or would result in a delay or waste of time. As noted supra, the proffered
testimony is relevant because it has a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable . . . than it would be
without the evidence," to wit, that Aranda was afraid of Hender and Myers given what
she knew of their violent past and was therefore compelled to participate in the present
crimes. Utah R. Evid. 401 (defining "relevant evidence"); see also Utah Code Ann. § 762-302 (Compulsion Defense).
Moreover, contrary to the trial court's conclusion, the proffered evidence would
not be confusing or misleading. R.360[78]. The court was concerned that the evidence
of Hender and Myers' criminal history and violent character would be confusing because
they were not witnesses in the trial. Id. Nothing in the language of Rule 405(b), 404,
403, 402, or 401 limits the admissibility of specific conduct evidence to that pertaining to
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trial participants alone. See generally Utah R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, 404, 405. Case law
shows that such evidence is routinely admitted under the evidentiary rules although the
person(s) it refers to is not a witness. See, e.g., Canamore. 411 N.E.2d at 294 (holding
that statement made by person not participating in defendant's trial was admissible to
show that she acted in good faith when she drove a car later discovered to be stolen).
Indeed, where, as here, the referenced persons are possible co-defendants who
would not testify to protect their Fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination,
admission of such testimony is necessary in order to preserve Aranda's due process right
to present her defense and to the privileges afforded under the evidentiary rules in pursuit
of that goal. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV; Utah Const, art. I, § 7. In the context of a
compulsion and other like defenses, limiting the application of the evidentiary rules to
allow testimony only if the referenced person participates in trial would significantly
curtail a criminal defendant's right to present her defense and ultimately subvert the
purpose of the evidentiary rules, which is to minimize prejudice to the accused.
Excluding the proffered testimony in Aranda's case on the basis that Hender and
Myers were not witnesses was unwarranted for the added reason that the jury was well
aware that they were involved in the crimes at issue. There was ample and unequivocal
evidence at trial, presented by both the State and the defense, establishing that Hender
and Myers were participants. Both Garcia and Rosales testified that they were there.
R.359[54-99,100-143]. The State stipulated that Myers' fingerprint was found on the
duct tape. R.359[168]. Moreover, Aranda identified Hender and Myers as the two men
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that accompanied her to the Garcia/Rosales apartment. R.360[37]. Where the identities
and involvement of Hender and Myers were so clearly presented to the jury, there is no
risk of confusion. If anything, the jury was unable to perform its constitutional duty of
determining guilt or innocence when Judge Frederick deprived it of information necessary
to assess Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah Const. Art. I, § 12 (right to fair and
impartial jury); U.S. Const, amend. VI (same). Consequently, Aranda was denied a trial
by a fair and impartial jury. Id,
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion in excluding
testimony under Utah Rule of Evidence 405(b) that went to Hender and Myers violent
activity and character. The evidence established Aranda's compulsion defense. See Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-302. In excluding the evidence, the trial court violated Aranda's
constitutional right to present a vigorous defense. See U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due
process); Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (same); McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. In addition, the jury
was prevented from hearing pertinent information going to Aranda's defense and,
ultimately, the guilt or innocence question. Hence, Aranda was denied her right to trial
by an impartial jury. See U.S. Const, amend. IV (right to impartial jury); Utah Const, art.
I, § 12 (same).
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ARANDA A
CONTINUANCE OR A NEW TRIAL AFTER A KEY WITNESS WAS
BARRED FROM ENTERING THE COURTHOUSE.
In the present case, one of Aranda's key witnesses, Terry Pierce, was barred from
entering the courthouse when he showed up to testify at her trial. R.325-26. According
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to the bailiffs, he was inebriated and barely able to walk. Id. After he was turned away
from the courthouse, Pierce went to his workplace at Labor Ready, then he went home.
R.363[4].
Aranda had subpoenaed Pierce and expected him to appear at trial to testify in her
defense. R.l 19 (subpoena). When she learned that Pierce had been turned away from
the courthouse, the trial court granted her a "brief recess" to locate him. R.360[77].
Unable to do so in the brief time allowed, she moved for a two-hour continuance in order
to find him. R.325-26. She had a home phone number for Pierce and was, therefore,
able to reach him if allowed to do so. R.363[5]. The trial court denied her motion.
R.360[77]. She made a related motion for a new trial, arguing that she was prejudiced by
the denial of the continuance. R.308-10 (written motion), 363 (oral motion). The trial
court denied the motion for a new trial. R.325-26.
With regard to absent witnesses and a related request for a new trial, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that ff[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . .to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . ." In
Washington v. Texas. 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967),
the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this guarantee where
the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of "testimony [that] would have
been relevant and material, and . . .vital to the defense." Id. at 16 []
(emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. 858,
102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that
the language of the sixth amendment and of Washington suggested that a
criminal defendant, in order to establish a violation of his constitutional
right to compulsory process, must make some plausible showing that the
testimony of the absent witness "would have been both material and
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favorable to his defense." IcL at 873 [] (footnote omitted). Testimony is
material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable
probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial. "A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome." Strickland v. Washington. 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d
674(1984).
"The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern
with the justice of the finding of g u i l t . . . . This means that the omission
must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no
reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered,
there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is
already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor
importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt."
Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. at 868 [] (citing United States v. Agurs. 427
U.S. 97, 112-13, 96 S.Ct. 2392, [] 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976)).
State v. Schreuden 712 P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985); see also Utah Const, art. I, § 12
(guaranteeing criminal defendants right to "have compulsory process to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf); U.S. Const, amend. XIV (due process); Utah
Const, art. I, § 7 (same); Utah R. Crim. P. 24 (2001) ("court may, upon motion of a party
or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or
impropriety which had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party").
The same constitutional concerns and a similar standard govern the propriety of a
continuance. See Hawaii v. Valmoja, 540 P.2d 63, 64 (Hawaii 1975) (holding that trial
court violated defendant's due process rights when it denied continuance that would allow
him to procure absent witness where witness1 testimony was relevant and material and
absence was not attributable to a lack of due diligence). "When a defendant in a criminal
action moves for a continuance in order to procure the testimony of an absent witness,
such a defendant must show that the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the
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witness could actually be produced, that the witness could be produced within a
reasonable time, and that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a
continuance." State v. Creviston. 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982).
In the present case, the trial court denied the continuance, stating:
I did allow you some time to go down and see if you couldn't locate him
after the word from the bailiffs was received. But I did deny your request
to continue the trial until such time as this witness had sobered up and you
could have him return.
R.360[77].
The trial court similarly denied Aranda's related motion for a new trial based on
the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. This Court adopts the stipulated proffer of facts submitted by counsel as
the factual record as to what Terry Pierce and Deputy Sisneros would have
testified to for Defendant's New Trial Motion.
2. During trial, as part of the defense case, Defendant expected to call as a
witness for the defense, Terry Pierce.
3. Mr. Pierce came to court, as asked by the defense, on the morning of
trial on February 10, 2000. Mr. Pierce was stopped by court security staff
based upon what Deputy Sisneros said was a strong smell of alcohol and
Mr. Pierce being in an obviously intoxicated state. Mr. Pierce was
intoxicated to the point that he was barely able to walk. Mr. Pierce was
ultimately told to leave the courthouse or he would be ticketed. Court
Bailiffs then notified the State and Defense counsel of what had happened.
4. Defense counsel took a short recess to find out what happened and then
requested a two hour continuance to attempt to locate Mr. Pierce who was
no longer in the area of the courthouse. That request was denied and the
trial resumed and concluded a few hours later the same day.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Mr. Pierce was intoxicated and therefore not able to enter the courthouse
or testify. There is no way to know when Mr. Pierce would have been in a
sober state of mind to be able to testify.
2. Defendant has not shown that Mr. Pierce would have been ready to
testify in a reasonable amount of time and in a sober state of mind.
Defendant has also not shown that even if Mr. Pierce's testimony would
have been allowed after a continuance, it would not have likely changed the
outcome of the trial.
Therefore, the Defendant has not shown that the denial of the
Defendant's motion to continue the trial to locate Mr. Pierce prejudiced the
Defendant and Defendant's Motion for a [N]ew Trial is denied.
R.325-26.
In light of Schreuder, Creviston, and the overarching constitutional concern that
Aranda be afforded the right to present her defense and obtain witnesses in her favor, the
trial court abused its discretion in denying both the continuance and the motion for a new
trial. See Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75; Creviston. 646 P.2d at 753; U.S. Const, amend.
VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12. To the extent that a motion for a new trial and a
continuance are governed by similar standards, they shall be addressed together under the
more specific criteria concerning denied motions for a continuance.
As an initial matter, Aranda established that Pierce's testimony was both "material
and admissible." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752; see also Schreuder. 712 P.2d at 274
(quoting Valenzuela-Bernal 458 U.S. at 873) (noting that witness' testimony must be
"'material and favorable to [] defense'"). Aranda summarized Pierce's anticipated
testimony at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, stating:
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What Mr. Pierce would testify to is . . . that he knew [Ho]norio Garcia and
Norma Rosales, that they were drug dealers[] that he frequented, that he
and Debbie had bought drugs for about one year from them. In fact, the
day before, the night before he bought drugs from [Ho]norio Garcia and
was arrested on the way home from that. When he was released from jail. .
. he knew John Hender and Greg Myers, Debbie had known Greg Myers. . .
That Debbie and Terry Pierce had been planning to leave town. He was
going to be working for Bonneville Construction. They sold his truck for
about a thousand dollars, got some other cash that he had been saving, was
going to introduce John and Greg to [Ho]norio Garcia so they could get
drugs from [him]. He, of course, was arrested the night before and so was
not involved in this incident that happened.
He would testify that he knew of no plan or, and Debbie had never
mentioned any plan to rob [Ho]norio or Norma. When he did get out of jail
he did have a conversation where John Hender had been bragging . . . about
how stupid Debbie had been in the situation and that she had not known
about the situation and that she had been the one who had been arrested.
Dick Hicks finally ran John Hender off of his property. And that would be
the extent of [Pierce's] testimony, other than he knew that Debbie was
intimidated by John Hender. He was sort of an imposing individual. That
would be the extent of his testimony had he been able to testify.
R.363[5-6]. Aranda offered a similar account of Pierce's anticipated testimony when she
argued for a continuance.2 The State stipulated to Aranda's summary of Pierce's

2

Aranda made the following proffer when she requested the continuance during a
trial recess:
[0]ne of my witnesses, Terry Pierce, would have testified to a number of
things that were important to our case if he had been here, including: That
he had bought drugs from [Garcia and Rosales] and has actually been
convicted of that charge; that he had information about how Debra reacted
around this John and Greg; had some information about John and Greg and
had information about what their plans were; the fact that Debra had not
planned any drug robbery or robbery of these people.
R.360[75-76].
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anticipated testimony in regard to both her request for a continuance and a new trial.
R.360[76],363[6]; cf Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (trial court properly denied continuance
where defendant did not make adequately detailed proffer; he merely stated that absent
witness1 testimony would be "Vital"' and that she would "'testify on his behalf").
Pierce's testimony was, in fact, material and admissible because it corroborated
Aranda's own testimony concerning the events and supports her compulsion defense. Slee
Utah R. Evid. 401 ("'relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence"); Utah R. Evid. 402
(relevant evidence is generally admissible); Utah R. Evid. 403 (relevant evidence
admissible when not prejudicial, cumulative, confusing, or cause delay); Utah R. Evid.
405(b) (permitting evidence of specific conduct to establish element of defense).
Specifically, Pierce's testimony would establish that Aranda was intimidated by
Hender and Myers and, therefore, coerced into committing the burglary and robberies.
See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-302 (compulsion defense); see, e.g., supra Point I (discussing
relevance of similar evidence under Rule 405(b) to Aranda's compulsion defense). For
instance, Pierce would testify that Hender, in particular, was so intimidating that even
Dick Hicks, Aranda's roommate, kicked him off his property. R.363[5-6]. His testimony
would also support the defense because it showed that Hender and Myers planned the
crimes without Aranda's knowledge, later bragging how dumb Aranda was to fall into
their plan. Id That Aranda was unaware of the planned crime would be underscored by
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Pierce's testimony that she never divulged the plan to him, id; since Aranda and Pierce
were involved in a relationship, it follows that she would share this secret if she in fact
knew about the crime in advance. Pierce's testimony would also corroborate Aranda's
testimony that Garcia and Rosales were drug dealers; and that Hender and Myers had
done business with them previously. Id Consequently, Pierce's testimony would
establish the likelihood that Hender and Myers had a robbery and burglary in mind when
they arranged to go to the Garcia/Rosales home with Aranda since drug dealers generally
have a lot of money on them.
Finally, Pierce's testimony would corroborate Aranda's assertion that the money
found on her when she was arrested came from the sale of Pierce's truck and not the
burglary/robberies; and that she and Pierce were, in fact, planning to leave town and she
had the money on her to cover their travel expenses. I d By extension, Pierce's testimony
would also corroborate Aranda's testimony that the duct tape in her purse may have been
placed there, without her knowledge, while they packed for the move. I d
The trial court additionally abused its discretion in failing to grant a continuance or
new trial because Pierce was available and "could [have] be[en] produced within a
reasonable time." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. During the motion for a continuance,
Aranda asked for a mere two hour break in the trial in which to locate Pierce. R.326.
She had Pierce's "home telephone number, and had a way to contact him." R.363[5].
In fact, it was likely that he could have been contacted within that time. As
Aranda explained at the hearing on the motion for a new trial, Pierce "left [the courthouse
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in the morning], he went back to work briefly at Labor Ready, and then went home."
R.363[4]. The record does not specify, but Pierce was probably home midmorning
considering that he left work that morning at 8:30 a.m. and came directly to the
courthouse. Id Accordingly, Aranda could have phoned Pierce at his home and left a
message if he was not there. Since he was at work for only a brief time, then went home,
he likely would have received the message before the end of trial, which went on until
almost 1:00 p.m. R.281 (minute entry noting that jury retired at 12:51 p.m.). Pierce
could have contacted her then, and she could have arranged for him to come back and
testify before trial ended that same afternoon. Additionally, although the record is
unclear, Aranda likely knew where Pierce worked since he was her boyfriend.
Consequently, she could have contacted him at Labor Ready if she was unable to reach
him at home. Cf Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752 (trial court did not abuse discretion in
denying continuance where absent witness would not be available to testify for months or
years; absent witness was a codefendant who asserted Fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination and, therefore, would not be available until after his own trial and
appeal was complete).
The trial court denied the continuance and the new trial on the assumption that
Pierce would not be sober enough to testify even if he was located within a reasonable
amount of time given his "propensities" to drink. R.363[l 1], This rationale is too
speculative to serve as a legitimate basis for the trial court's denial. Although Pierce had
a beer the morning of trial and was drunk when he appeared at the courthouse, R.363[4],
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nothing in the record suggests that he was unable to sober up in time to testify later that
afternoon. Generally, it is not good policy for courts to preclude witness testimony on
the premise that a person given to drink is incapable of sobering up. It is an unfortunate
reality that many people abuse alcohol. Nonetheless, they, like Pierce, are able sober up
enough to hold down jobs and perform any of a number of important tasks, including
testifying competently at trial. Accordingly, the trial court should have given Pierce the
benefit of the doubt and granted the continuance or new trial. Indeed, Aranda's
constitutional right to present her witness and establish her defense outweighs any
speculative risk that Pierce may have been too inebriated to testify competently. See,
e.g.. State v. Tolano. 2001 UT App 37, ^J13, 414 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (defendant's "right to
a fair trial outweighed any inconvenience to the court, the opposing party, and the jury
that may have been caused by a continuance" sought to obtain information on proposed
expert witness).
As a final matter, the denial of the continuance and new trial amounted to an abuse
of discretion because Aranda exercised "due diligence" in securing Pierce's attendance.
Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752. She subpoenaed Pierce on January 3, 2000. R.l 19; see
Valmoja, 540 P.2d at 64 (trial court erred in denying continuance where defendant
properly subpoenaed absent witness). He obviously received the subpoena to the extent
that he appeared at the courthouse to testify on the morning of her trial. R.325. In
addition, she promptly requested a continuance of trial when she learned of his absence.
See State v. Gehring, 694 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1984) (new trial not required to secure
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absent witness where defendant failed to first request continuance).
In light of the foregoing, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied a
continuance or a new trial for the purpose of locating Pierce. Pierce's testimony was
material and admissible; he could have been located and made available to testify within
a reasonable time; and Aranda exercised due diligence in otherwise making him available
to testify. See State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); State v. Schreuder. 712
P.2d 264, 274-75 (Utah 1985). In denying the continuance or new trial, the trial court
violated Aranda's constitutional right to present witnesses in her favor and make her
defense. See U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12.
III. THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRORS MERIT REVERSAL
INDIVIDUALLY AND CUMULATIVELY.
The trial court's errors merit reversal individually and cumulatively. See, e.g..
State v. Featherson, 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) (reviewing erroneous admission of
character evidence for harmless error); see also State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah
App. 1991) (citation omitted) ("moving party must show that it was materially prejudiced
by the court's denial of the continuance or that the trial result would have been different
had the continuance been granted"); Shreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75 (denial of new trial
merits reversal if it prejudices moving party).
Individually, the court's errors were not harmless because Aranda was materially
prejudiced in that she was effectively prevented from presenting her compulsion defense
and, consequently, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would
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have been different absent the errors. See State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987)
(defining reversible error as that which materially prejudices defendant or creates "fa
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant1") (citations and
quotations omitted). First, the errors were prejudicial because the proffered testimony
regarding Hender and Myers' violent conduct and propensities, as well as Pierce's
testimony concerning Aranda's fear of them, was integral to her compulsion defense.
See, e.g.. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (considering importance of
testimony to defendant's case in assessing harmlessness). The only other evidence going
to her compulsion defense consisted of her own testimony. Cf Oliver, 820 P.2d at 477
(defendant did not show that trial outcome would be different had continuance been
granted where defense counsel was able to explore areas that would have been covered
by absent witness through other witnesses present at trial). A jury is more likely to
believe a defendant whose testimony is corroborated by a third party witness, such as
Eaton, Pierce or Detective Nudd. See supra Point I-II (discussing how evidence supports
compulsion defense). The prejudice is amplified in this case in that Detective Nudd
would likely sway a jury even more considering that he is a representative of the State,
was a witness for the state, and does not have the same bias toward Aranda as her own
witnesses may be perceived to have.
To this extent, the Hawaii Supreme Court's opinion in Valmoja is compelling. 540
P.2d at 64. There, a trial court's decision to deny a continuance, requested on account of
absent witnesses, was held to be prejudicial error because it impacted the defendant's
36

ability to present his defense and violated his right for obtaining witnesses in his favor.
14 (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)); see also U.S. Const, amend. VI &
XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 &12. The Valmoja Court reasoned,
the materiality of the testimony of at least one of the absent witnesses with
respect to the defendant's alibi defense became apparent during the trial,
[and hence] this omission was clearly prejudicial. The defendant in a
criminal prosecution is entitled to compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor. By denying the motion for a continuance when
defense counsel had acted diligently to procure the absent witnesses and
their testimony was relevant and material to the defense, the district judge
denied this right to the defendant.
Id. (citing Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (other citation omitted)). As in
Valmoja, the exclusion of the evidence under Rule 405(b), as well as the denial of the
continuance or new trial which would have allowed Aranda to present Pierce's testimony,
is prejudicial error because it violated her constitutional right to present witnesses in her
favor and significantly impaired her ability to present her compulsion defense. See id.;
U.S. Const, amends. VI & XIV; Utah Const, art. I, §§ 7 & 12.
The denial of the continuance or new trial, and the resulting inability to present
Pierce's testimony, constitutes prejudicial error for the added reason that Pierce's
testimony would have bolstered Aranda's own testimony. For example, Pierce would
corroborate that the money found on her person when she was arrested was intended for
use on her trip with Pierce and that it derived from the sale of his truck, rather than the
proceeds from the robbery and burglary. R.360[48,72-73],363[5-6]. It would also
corroborate her statement that she and Pierce previously arranged to leave town together
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to go to his new job, and that she was not fleeing Salt Lake to escape authorities.
R.360[38],363[5-6]. Moreover, by inference, Pierce's testimony that he and Aranda were
moving would bolster her statement that the duct tape in her backpack, allegedly used to
bind Garcia and Rosales, was in fact placed there as she packed for the move and that she
did not realize it given that her purse was so large and she was otherwise distracted by all
that she had to do in preparation for the move. R.360[64],363[5-6]. Standing alone,
Aranda's statements may appear in the eyes of the jury nothing but dubious claims from a
person trying to escape guilt. However, bolstered by Pierce, Aranda's testimony takes on
a new significance and credibility. Hence, Pierce's testimony could likely sway the jury
toward a verdict of "not guilty." See Knight, 734 P.2d at 919.
The errors are individually prejudicial for the added reason that the other evidence
against Aranda is not overwhelming or compelling. Cf. Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 240
(erroneous admission of improper character evidence harmless given substantial other
evidence supporting the verdict). The only direct evidence against Aranda consisted of
the testimonies of Garcia and Rosales. Although they testified that she was present
during the burglary and robberies, their testimony is consistent with her defense of
compulsion to the extent that very little of what they said indicates that she willingly
participated in the crimes. For instance, they stated that she rummaged through the back
room and took some of their valuables. R.359[68,108-09]. However, such evidence
leaves open the question of whether she participated willingly in the crimes. In addition,
Rosales and Garcia testified that she had their gold jewelry on her person when she was
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arrested. R.359[78]. This evidence does not compellingly negate her compulsion
defense either since she would have taken it, compelled to do so by Hender and Myers.
The only element of Garcia and Rosales' testimony which might undercut Aranda's
defense is their allegation that she pulled the duct tape from her purse, which leads to the
inference that she was involved in the planning of the crime and was not coerced or
surprised when it happened. R.359[63,106]. But, that testimony is consistent with
Aranda's, which is that she did not remember bringing duct tape and that it may have been
placed in her backpack, a large and cavernous sack where something might be placed and
not seen, without her knowledge while she packed for a move. R.360[64]. Moreover,
Rosales herself testified that the duct tape may have belonged her husband, who uses
similar tape in his mechanic business. R.359[138].
The other evidence against Aranda was circumstantial and similarly uncompelling
as to her guilt. For instance, the State presented that Aranda bought a car for $750 after
the crimes, and that several hundred dollars was found on her person when she was at the
jail. R.359[158],360[18]. The presence of a large sum of money is not compelling since
many people carry a lot of money for varied and legitimate reasons. And, in fact, Aranda
testified that she had the money because she and Pierce just sold his truck and were
preparing to leave on a trip. R.360[48,72-73]. Hence, she was able to buy the car with
legitimately procured funds and not the illicit proceeds of the burglary and robberies.
The State also presented evidence of post-arrest statements made by Aranda. The
first statement concerned her misrepresentation to the police that an initial "H" on a ring
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found in her pocket stood for her son, "Hajacob." R.360[15]. This evidence does not
unequivocally or compellingly point to guilt because it is not unusual for someone to be
evasive around police out of nervousness. See, e.g.. State v. Trujillo. 739 P.2d 85, 86
(Utah App. 1987) (officers did not have reasonable suspicion where defendant merely
demonstrated nervousness around officer). Indeed, Aranda had cause to be nervous,
having just been forced into committing the burglary and robbery; fearing reprisals from
either Garcia, Hender or Myers; and facing arrest, in the presence of at least two officers,
for crimes that she did not willingly commit.
The second set of statements is equally ambiguous concerning her guilt. When she
was in the jail, Aranda stated to Officer Lozano, "I'm being accused of. . . robbing a drug
dealer, how ironic." R.360[22]. Aranda followed up by telling Lozano that the police
must not "want the jewelry bad enough because she could take [them] to where it was."
R.360[20]. First, Aranda's use of the word "accused" negates any inference of guilt.
Indeed, it was a correct assessment of her situation: she was, in fact, accused of robbery
at the time she made the statement, and had been informed so by Lozano shortly before
she said these words. Second, her statement regarding the whereabouts of the jewelry is
not compelling evidence of guilt. Since she was with Hender and Myers after they
coerced her into participating in the crimes, it follows that she would know where the
jewelry was. Hence, Aranda's statements are not compelling of guilt, and thereby
underscore the prejudicial effect of the court's errors.
Even if one or the other of the court's errors is not prejudicial, their cumulative
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effect is. "Under the cumulative error doctrine, [an appellate court] reverse[s] only if'the
cumulative effect of the several errors undermines our confidence ... that a fair trial was
had.1" State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1229 (Utah 1993) (citations omitted). In assessing a
cumulative error claim, a reviewing court "considers] all the identified errors, as well as
any other errors [it] assume[s] may have occurred." Id. For the reasons identified above,
the cumulative effect of the court's errors in Aranda's case materially prejudiced her
constitutional right to present her compulsion defense and call witnesses in her favor, and
rendered a different trial outcome likely had the errors not occurred. Accordingly, the
trial court's exclusion of pertinent and integral evidence under Rule 405(b), and its
erroneous denial of a new trial or continuance for the purpose of securing a key defense
witness, "undermines [any] confidence . . that a fair trial was had.'" Dunn, 850 P.2d at
1229 (Utah 1993) (quotation omitted).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, Aranda respectfully requests this Court to reverse her
convictions and remand her case to the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY submitted this f & a y of June, 2001.

CATHERINE E. LILLY
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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^GSD
THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs

Case No: 991910677 FS

DEBRA LARECE ARANDA,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

J. DENNIS FREDERICK
March 17, 2000

ENTERED IN REGISTRY
PRESENT
OF JUDGMENTS
Clerk:
cindyb
Reporter: TRIPP, DOROTHY
DATE.
Prosecutor: MEISTER, VINCENT B
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): FINLAYSON, DAVID V
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: July 1, 1957
CAT/CIC
Tape Number:
1:23-1:25

Tape Count: 12:52-1:09

CHARGES
AGGRAVATED BURGLARY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea
ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/09/2000 Guilty Plea

Criminal Sentence

Commitment

JD
Page 1

Case No: 991910677
Date:
Mar 17, 2000
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED BURGLARY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ROBBERY a 1st
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than five years and which may be life in the Utah State
Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in
the Utah State Prison.
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Counts #2 and #3 to run concurrently with each other but
consecutive to Count #1. Counts #6 and #7 to run concurrently with
each other but consecutive to Count #1. Counts #1-3 have
consecutive one year weapons enhancements.

Paqe 2

** __^

Case No: 991910677
Date:
Mar 17, 2000
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
The Court recommends defendant receive substance abuse therapy at
the prison. The Court grants credit for 3 00 days time served.

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is
sentenced to a term of 6 month(s)

SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Restitution:
Amount: $14400.00 Plus Interest
This restitution is to be paid joint and severally with the
co-defendants.
Dated t h i s

fc

day of
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